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INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom holds that patents contribute to progress.' This
sentiment underlies the Copyright and Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which states, "The Congress shall have Power... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries .... This traditional rationale posits that grants of monopoly
power provide an effective incentive for parties to invest in costly research
and development to bring new inventions to market.3 Organizations such as
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, for example,
argue that patent protection is necessary to recoup the hundreds of millions
of dollars in initial investments necessary to develop new drugs. 4 Without
such protection, copiers could simply free ride on the ingenuity and
investment of creative enterprises, thus depleting the latter of any incentive
to innovate. Society ultimately benefits, the conventional wisdom goes, by
encouraging innovation and advancing the state of science and technology
available to the public at large.
A growing counterintuitive insight, however, holds that patents actually
deter innovation. At a fundamental level, patents conflict with traditional
scientific norms of open sharing. Furthermore, proclaimers of the "tragedy
of the anticommons" contend that overpropertization of resources results in
1. While commentators generally relate patents to scientific and technical advancement,
courts have also situated patents within a broader program of social and economic progress.
Regarding patent laws, the Supreme Court has noted, "The authority of Congress is exercised in
the hope that '[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the
emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens."' Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
480 (1974)) (alteration in original).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. See Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles
Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 76 (2002) (arguing that
the U.S. intellectual property system expressly advocates "harnessing the profit motive to promote
artistic and scientific progress").
4. One oft-cited but controversial 2001 study from Tufts University estimates that the average
cost to develop a new drug is $802 million. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price ofInnovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003); see also Ceci
Connolly, Price Tag for a New Drug: $802 Million, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2001, at A1O.
Opportunity costs, however, represent almost half of this figure. Public Citizen, using data from
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, estimates the after-tax R&D costs for
developing a new drug in the 1990s to be $56.5 to $71.0 million. PUBLIC CITIZEN, RX R&D
MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY'S R&D "SCARE CARD" 6 tbl.2 (2001),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/acfdc.pdf.
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their underuse. 5 In biotechnology, the increased patenting of "research
tools"-materials, protocols, and equipment that comprise critical inputs of
scientific experiments-has heightened anxieties that patents inhibit
research and development.6 Revisiting the example of pharmaceuticals,
patents on upstream "building block" materials or on foundational
experimental protocols may hinder downstream investigations and efforts to
translate basic science into useful drugs. In this manner, patents can stifle
innovation and hamper progress.
While both traditional and anticommons theories focus on patents'
relationship to progress in technology,7 this Note takes a different approach.
Moving beyond the level of applied science, this Note examines patents'
contribution to the advancement of scientific theory, the scientific
community's conceptual understanding of the basic structure and properties
of natural phenomena. Current scholarship has largely ignored patents' role
in the evolution of scientific theory and lacks a robust analytic framework
for conceptualizing this relationship. This Note looks to the "scientific
humanities" to fill this void and bring to light the significant and
unexpected influence of patents on scientific and inventive activity. This
Note thus adds a new perspective to the intellectual property debate by
drawing on the history, philosophy, and sociology of science to argue that
patents may play a surprising role in the evolution of the scientific
community's basic understanding of natural phenomena.
Throughout this analysis, the theory of scientific paradigms as
expounded by philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn and the distinction
between what he calls "normal science" and "paradigm shifts" will be
central.8  Research and application within a dominant theoretical
5. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
6. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines "research tools" as "tools that scientists
use in the laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR),
methods, laboratory equipment and machines." Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH
Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources:
Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n. 1 (Dec. 23, 1999).
7. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 79 (1999). While Rai evaluates the influences of law
and norms on basic science research, she situates her analysis in an instrumental view that
emphasizes patents' relationship to technological progress. She does not consider patents' effects
on the evolution of scientific theory, instead framing her inquiry in terms of "the central
instrumental goals of intellectual property--success in stimulating the creation, disclosure, and
development of inventive or creative works." Id.
8. While Rebecca Eisenberg has also discussed Kuhn's framework in the context of patents'
influence on basic science, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1051-52 (1989), this Note is
unique in applying the concept of paradigm shifts to explain how patents may advance scientific
theory.
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framework-what Kuhn calls a scientific paradigm-comprises "normal
science." 9 The creation of a novel theoretical framework that better explains
a particular set of natural phenomena comprises a paradigm shift, the most
fundamental kind of scientific change. For example, progress in normal
science might involve innovatively applying current theories of neural
physiology to stimulate cell growth in the human brain through the use of
embryonic stem cells. In contrast, paradigmatic change would involve
creating an entirely new theoretical model of how the brain works.
Ultimately, a paradigm shift such as this could suggest novel ways to
induce spontaneous regeneration of neurons that do not require embryonic
stem cells.
Combining the concept of paradigm shifts with an anticommons
approach to property theory, this Note argues that strong patent protection
of research tools--critical inputs of scientific experiments-can play a vital
first step in inducing paradigm shifts. This Note will review how patents
conflict with scientific norms of communal sharing and how patenting
upstream research tools can discourage experimentation and testing. 0 By
raising the cost of "doing science" within an established paradigm,
however, patents encourage scientists to create alternate theories of how
natural phenomena operate, theories whose investigation does not depend
on using patented research tools. Patents thus accelerate the process by
which researchers generate and test insurgent scientific theories. While
most of these theories will prove incorrect or no better than the current
paradigm in terms of empirical validity and predictive capacity, some will
more successfully explain how a natural process, such as neurogenesis,
functions. By accelerating the creation of alternate theories, patents increase
the likelihood that scientists will challenge existing paradigms and replace
them with new ones.
9. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (3d ed. 1996).
10. One of this Note's subsidiary theses is that the lines between "basic" and "applied"
research, and between "noncommercial" and "commercial" research, are increasingly blurring.
Nevertheless, for purposes of clarity I will attempt to differentiate between these various kinds of
scientific activity. Throughout this Note, "basic" research refers to upstream research aimed at
elucidating the fundamental structure and properties of natural phenomena. While useful
application of this research is conceivable, its primary goal is to uncover elementary principles.
"Applied" research refers to downstream testing and experimental work that applies basic
knowledge to solve practical problems. "Noncommercial" research is research motivated
primarily by factors other than financial remuneration. "Commercial" research, conversely, is
research primarily motivated by financial gain. While there is significant overlap between "basic"
and "noncommercial" research, on the one hand, and "applied" and "commercial," on the other,
these respective pairs are not coextensive. A pharmaceutical company, for example, could sponsor
in-house basic science research with the clear commercial aim of developing profitable drugs.
Similarly, many university-based researchers conduct applied, noncommercial research and are
motivated by goodwill, curiosity, or reputational rewards.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004)
664 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114:659
While this paradigm-shift-inducing dynamic may apply to a wide range
of scientific disciplines, this Note will focus on biomedical research. The
growing commercialization and commodification of biomedical science
have allowed patents to exert substantial influence over basic research
activities. Scientific, economic, statutory, and legal developments
increasingly allow and encourage universities to patent products of
federally funded research. In parallel, the common law doctrine of the
experimental use exception-which traditionally allowed free use of
patented material for noncommercial purposes-has been significantly
narrowed in the context of university research. In this manner,
"[b]iotechnology research presents an unusual, if not unprecedented,
juxtaposition of the [proprietary] incentives of the patent law system" and
the traditional scientific norm of communal sharing."
Although scientists cannot patent abstract theories such as E = mc2,
they can patent the associated technological aids that researchers need to
investigate them.' 2 Patents on research tools earlier and earlier in the
development chain thus raise the possibility of creating individual
ownership rights in theories. All theories suggest means of testing and
validating themselves. The current "central dogma" of DNA translation and
transcription has defined and rendered meaningful an entire material culture
of technologies ranging from restriction enzymes to electrophoresis
machines. These physical artifacts both reflect prevailing assumptions of
DNA structure and function and allow scientists to extend, test, and apply
those assumptions. Patents on biotechnology research tools can therefore
effectively create exclusive rights to explore certain foundational theories.
For example, patents on human embryonic stem cells restrict the universe
of researchers who can investigate the hypothesis that these cells can
differentiate into any type of human tissue. As research tools become more
specialized and propertized, more and more fields of inquiry will ultimately
fall under the domain of patents. While this raises concerns over the
inhibitory effect of patents on scientific progress, it also opens the door for
patents to help induce paradigm shifts.
Analyzing patent law through the lens of paradigm shifts reveals an
important but underappreciated benefit of strong patent protection. Patents,
by encouraging scientists to experiment outside the realm of mainstream
research tools, encourage them to generate and test new theories. Some of
11. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 179 (1987) (footnote omitted).
12. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("Einstein could not patent his
celebrated law that E=mc2 ; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity."); Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (stating that basic science discoveries
are "manifestations of... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none").
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these theories will more completely and cleanly explain the operation of
natural processes, thus deepening our fundamental understanding of nature.
Considering the role of patents in the evolution of scientific theory thus
deepens any debate on the function and value of patents. Arguments that
too much patent protection deters innovation may only be considering one
level of innovation-that of technological advancement. In this new light,
however, any detrimental effect that patents may have on discouraging
downstream research and development must be weighed against their value
in encouraging the paradigm shifts that advance fundamental scientific
theory. Patents emerge as a fulcrum defining the balance between two kinds
of valuable scientific activity: hypothesis validation and exploration
(comprising the main business of normal science) and hypothesis
generation (leading to paradigm shifts). Without recognizing this function,
policy choices defining patent regimes are uninformed and incomplete.
Consistent with its interdisciplinary orientation, this Note draws on
several parallel sources to build its central arguments. Part I introduces the
concept of paradigm shifts, the dominant framework for this Note's
examination of patents and progress. Part II explores the current debate
over whether patents contribute to progress, a debate that implicitly focuses
on what Kuhn would call normal science. Though the Note leaves
unresolved the question of whether patents, on balance, promote or hinder
normal scientific progress, it does highlight the capacity for patents to
create tragedies of the anticommons and stifle productive scientific
exchange. Part III focuses on the increasing patenting of research tools-a
result of recent scientific, economic, statutory, and legal changes-that
enables patents to influence the development of new theories. Part IV
applies the theory of paradigm shifts to the tragedy of the anticommons to
argue that patents, by increasing the costs of research within a particular
scientific paradigm, encourage scientists to "theorize around" existing
paradigms, thus contributing to paradigm shifts. The Note concludes with a
prescription for a time-limited experimental use exception for patented
biomedical research tools to more effectively promote both the normal
science and paradigm shifts that drive scientific progress.
I. THE THEORY OF PARADIGM SHIFTS
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions presents what
has become the dominant contemporary theory of scientific evolution.
13
Central to Kuhn's view is the concept of a paradigm: a prevailing
13. I purposefully use the term "evolution" to parallel Kuhn's characterization of scientific
progress.
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theoretical framework that defines a particular branch of science at any
given time. Looking historically, a paradigm exists when "some accepted
examples of actual scientific practice-examples which include law, theory,
application, and instrumentation together-provide models from which
spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research." 14 Ptolemaic
astronomy, Copernican astronomy, Aristotelian dynamics, and Newtonian
dynamics are all examples of scientific paradigms.1 5 These paradigms
represent the consensus of a particular scientific community around a given
theory at a particular point in time. They act as a heuristic mechanism that
defines modes of promising research and provide a theoretical filter through
which scientists can interpret and comprehend their findings. 16
Kuhn rejected the linear, orderly, and often teleological vision of
scientific progress that had long dominated historiographies of science as
well as the popular imagination. 17 In this traditional view, science
progresses in an accumulative fashion; each discovery builds upon the vast
generations of discoveries before it in an inexorable drive toward higher
levels of comprehension of the natural world. Isaac Newton's famous
observation, "If I have seen further it is by standing on the sho[u]lders of
Giants," 18 encapsulates this vision of cumulative advancement. This
accretive vision grew naturally from the orderly worldview of Newtonian
mechanics and the Enlightenment commitment to progress, and reflects
how most elementary science textbooks characterize scientific progress. To
take an example from physics, traditionalists would see the works of
14. KUHN, supra note 9, at 10.
15. Id.
16. While empirical validity and enhanced predictive power motivate the adoption of a new
paradigm, Kuhn points out that paradigms are social constructions whose existence depends in
large part on human consensus rather than objective correctness. Because paradigms represent
embodiments of scientific consensus at any given time, they may be difficult to identify as they
occur and their contours may exhibit some flux. A paradigm may appear more concrete to
historians in hindsight than it did to individuals who practiced science within it.
17. Within the historiography of science, there is still some disagreement between those who
accept an accumulative model, which emphasizes the incorporation of past achievements, and
others, like Kuhn, who highlight nonlinear, revolutionary progress. See JOHN LOSEE, THEORIES
OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS (2004) (providing arguments in favor of both accumulative and
paradigmatic models of scientific advancement). Without entering the debate over which is more
correct, the historical evidence in favor of Kuhn's theory corroborates its value as a framework for
evaluating the relationship between patents and scientific progress. See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 9,
at 11-12 (discussing the history of optics); id. at 13-18 (describing the development of theories of
electricity); id. at 68-69 (discussing the emergence of Copernican astronomy). Furthermore, Kuhn
acknowledges the value of accumulative processes in normal science, where prior discoveries
inform subsequent work within a prevailing paradigm. id. at 15. Therefore, the most complete
reading of Kuhn reveals that his theory integrates both the accumulative model of progress in
normal science and the revolutionary progress that defines paradigm shifts.
18. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/6), in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF ISAAC NEWTON, 1661-1675, at 416, 416 (H.W. Tumbull ed., 1959).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004]
Galileo, Newton, and Einstein as forming an orderly chain of discoveries
building toward higher levels of truth.
Drawing from his empirical work both as a historian and scientist,
Kuhn challenged this accretive vision. Examining myriad scientific
revolutions throughout history, Kuhn concluded instead that science
advances most profoundly not through smooth, linear progressions but
through disjointed paradigm shifts from one dominant theoretical
framework to another. The history of optics provides an illustrative
example. In the eighteenth century, Newton conceived of light as material
corpuscles that flew through the air.19 Later, studies by Thomas Young and
Augustin Fresnel in the nineteenth century seemingly demonstrated that
light was best understood as transverse wave motion.20 Finally, Planck and
Einstein in the early twentieth century showed that light is composed of
photons, quantum-mechanical entities that display properties of both waves
and particles. 21 At each transition, empirical inconsistencies and
inexplicable data ultimately forced scientists to abandon the dominant
paradigm and adopt a new one that more clearly and cleanly explained
observable phenomena. Our understanding of optics progressed not in a
smooth linear fashion but through a succession of dramatic gestalt shifts in
how scientists conceived of light.
Kuhn thus distinguished two modes of scientific endeavor: "normal
science" and epoch-changing "paradigm shifts." Normal science, which
characterizes the vast majority of scientific activity, involves
experimentation and application within a dominant paradigm. An example
of normal science is the period prior to Oswald Avery's identification of
DNA as the basis for genetic inheritance, when molecular biologists around
the world focused on proteins rather than nucleic acids as the material for
genetic transmission. Research during periods of normal science focuses on
filling out the dominant paradigm, addressing interstitial theoretical gaps,
and pursuing lines of research that the paradigm itself suggests as
worthwhile. The paradigm defines certain puzzles, and normal science
works to solve those puzzles.22
In the course of refining the dominant paradigm, however,
inconsistencies begin to emerge. In Kuhn's vision, normal science
ultimately "generat[es] anomalous results that cannot be explained in terms
of the prevailing theory,, 23 thus leading to crisis. The paradigm becomes
tattered and frayed at the edges, inviting scientists to challenge it in new
19. KUHN, supra note 9, at 12.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 11-12.
22. Id. at 36-39.
23. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1052.
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and unexpected ways. In this manner, Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg, and
others abandoned Newtonian mechanics, with its emphasis on continuity,
and developed quantum mechanics to explain the properties of subatomic
particles. Ultimately, "insurgent" scientists discredit and discard the old
theory, and a new one takes its place. A paradigm shift has occurred. Soon,
normal science begins afresh, and scientists work to fill out the details and
nuances of the new framework. Like Stephen Jay Gould's concept of
"punctuated equilibrium, ' 24 the scientific community, after undergoing a
seismic paradigm shift, eventually settles into the homeostasis of normal
science until a new theory comes along to displace the current one.25
Drawing from these observations, Kuhn recognized several kinds of
scientific progress. Within normal science, dominant paradigms present
problems, and "the result of solving those problems must inevitably be
progress. 26 Turning to paradigm shifts, Kuhn drew an analogy between
deep scientific progress and biological evolution.27 Just as natural selection
has led to a "steady emergence of more elaborate, further articulated, and
vastly more specialized organisms, '28  each successive paradigm.
distinguishes itself from the one it displaces by representing an
"increasingly detailed and refined understanding of nature." 29 As with
Darwinism, Kuhn felt that his vision of progress through paradigm shifts
would unsettle traditionalists because it posited development away from
primitive origins but toward no particular goal.30 While Kuhn denied that
science had a definable teleological end, his exposition of the structure of
scientific revolutions nevertheless reveals a commitment to the concept of
scientific progress.
The theory of paradigm shifts thus provides an analytic framework for
evaluating patent law's contribution to scientific advancement. Patent
24. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 745-1024 (2002)
(arguing that evolution is characterized by long periods of stasis punctuated by episodes of rapid
development of new biological forms).
25. Interestingly, several scholars have applied the theory of paradigm shifts to explain
progress in law. In this view, a particular legal doctrine represents a dominant paradigm. In an
analogy to normal science, courts hear cases and fill in interstitial gaps within the doctrine,
stretching and adapting the doctrine to address novel factual predicates. Adverse outcomes or
external forces such as changing social mores lead to increasing distinctions and exceptions to the
doctrine. Ultimately, in a process symbolized by reversal, an authoritative court induces a
paradigm shift by renouncing the old doctrine and articulating a new one to take its place. Lower
courts then resume the normal business of filling out the details of the dominant legal paradigm.
See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1522-23 (1988); Laurence H. Tribe,
The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 n. I (1989).
26. KUHN, supra note 9, at 166.
27. Id. at 170-73.
28. Id. at 172.
29. Id. at 170.
30. Id. at 172.
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commentators have largely framed their scholarship in the utilitarian terms
of the constitutional mandate "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts," 3 1 and have consequently focused on the contribution of patents
to applied research and the development of useful technologies. 32 Kuhn's
theory, however, provides a framework for a deeper inquiry into how
patents actually help advance science itself. Consequently, a novel question
arises: How do patents help or hinder scientific paradigm shifts? That
question represents the central concern of this Note.
In exploring the contribution of patents to paradigm shifts, it is first
useful to examine how contemporary patent scholars have conceptualized
the relationship between patents and progress. Arguments both for and
against patents demonstrate the degree to which legal commentators have
been preoccupied with relating patents to normal progress rather than to the
evolution of scientific theory. Taking this analysis a step further, the
argument that patents actually deter scientific exchange within prevailing
paradigms is important in establishing the larger thesis that patents
encourage the generation of alternate scientific theories that drive paradigm
shifts.
II. INNOVATION-ENHANCING AND INNOVATION-INHIBITING EFFECTS
OF PATENTS N NORMAL SCIENCE
A. Traditional Justifications for Patent Law
The Copyright and Patent Clause reflects the conventional wisdom
behind patent protection: Granting a limited monopoly creates incentives
for innovation in science and technology. 33 By constraining the free use of
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. Intellectual property scholars have indicated that, contrary to modem connotations,
"Science" relates to the copyright system while "useful Arts" relate to patents. EDWARD C.
WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 19 (1998); see In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958-59 (C.C.P.A.
1979) ("[T]he constitutionally-stated purpose of granting patent rights to inventors for their
discoveries is the promotion of progress in the 'useful Arts,' rather than in science."), vacated in
part sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028, aff'd, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United States'
Ability To Harmonize?, 22 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (2004).
33. Malla Pollack has argued that "Progress" in the Constitution is actually best read to mean
"spread" or "diffusion" rather than some notion of substantive innovation. Malla Pollack, What Is
Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining "Progress" in Article L Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755 (2001).
This insight appears to run contrary to this Note's assumption that encouraging innovation
represents the primary rationale for patents. Pollack, however, concedes that "according to
Enlightenment Idea of Progress theorists, wide dissemination of information was a requirement
for qualitative improvement of arts and sciences." Id. at 773. Ultimately, then, even Pollack's
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technical innovations, patents increase the value of such innovations and
ensure that more will be generated, thus benefiting society as a whole.34
Courts have recognized that the two main objectives of the patent system
are to provide incentives to invent and to disclose. 35 Traditional patent
theory also posits that patents provide an incentive to put existing
inventions to good use. Following the creation of a new invention,
considerable effort and resources are typically required to develop it into a
marketable product.36 The lure of monopoly profits encourages firms to
invest in developing existing inventions into practical applications.37 In a
competitive economic landscape, innovative firms displace those unwilling
to invest in new technologies in a dynamic process of "creative
destruction.,
38
Prospect theory holds that patents facilitate innovation by rationalizing
the allocation of resources necessary to develop a particular invention.39 An
analogy exists between patent rights and prospecting rights for mineral
extraction. In the absence of such an exclusive right, a tragedy of the
commons may ensue, in which multiple parties simultaneously attempt to
exploit the same resources, leading to overuse and inefficient allocation of
social resources.40 The sentiment that "private ownership of physical goods
is justified because of the tragedy of the commons or problems with
efficiency 'A applies to intellectual property as well. Whereas a single
patent holder can orchestrate exploitation of a technological prospect,
allowing all parties free access to that prospect may produce "chaotic,
duplicative, and wasteful" effort.42
reading of "Progress" as "spread" leads to a conclusion that the Framers intended for patents to
contribute to scientific progress by stimulating innovation.
34. JOAN ROBINSON, THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL 87 (2d ed. 1966). Because this Note
is concerned with examining the relationship between patents and scientific progress, it does not
specifically consider what can be analogized as the "authorial" rights of an inventor in his or her
work. This type of claim, which finds some parallel in the copyright concept of "moral rights,"
might argue for patent protection based on some inherent respect for the individual integrity of the
inventor. This Note instead focuses on (and extends) progress-based rationales for patent systems
that have long dominated academic and policy debates.
35. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1024-30.
36. Id. at 1037.
37. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-110 (3d ed.
1950).
38. Id. at 83.
39. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 267-71 (1977).
40. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(discussing the concept of the tragedy of the commons and arguing that unfettered population
growth threatens to deplete natural resources and is therefore unsustainable).
41. Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case
Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REv. 601, 611 (2003).
42. Richard D. Nelson & Roberto Mazzoleni, Economic Theories About the Costs and
Benefits of Patents, in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
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B. Rebuttals to Traditional Patent Theory: Scientific Communism and the
Tragedy of the A nticommons
1. Norms of Communal Sharing and Implications for Patent Law
Contrary to traditional patent theorists, normative and transaction cost
analyses reveal that patents may actually hinder progress. Sociologist of
science Robert Merton has suggested that patents undermine the communal
values that promote normal science.43 Merton characterized science as
combining four normative pillars: universalism, communism,
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. 44 While patent regimes
impinge on all of these norms, they particularly impact scientific
communism, the principle that "[t]he substantive findings of science are a
product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community." 5
Merton's empirical studies debunked the popular conception of the
solitary scientist toiling alone in his laboratory. He showed instead that
scientists work in communities, where sharing information, theories, and
even materials fundamentally facilitates basic research. Drawing from this
communal norm, Merton argued that scientific knowledge constituted "a
common heritage in which the equity of the individual producer is severely
limited., 46 Scientists depend on each other to validate their claims,
particularly in the context of peer-reviewed scientific publications, and
access to research findings and methodologies is therefore crucial. This
ethic whittles individual property rights in scientific knowledge "down to a
bare minimum.'
47
Extrapolating from these norms, Merton argued that "[t]he communism
of the scientific ethos is incompatible with the definition of technology as
'private property' in a capitalistic economy.' '48 In his view, fencing off
areas in the open plain of collaborative discovery would fundamentally
RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 17, 23 (1997), available at http://books.nap.edu/
html/property.
43. As Arti Rai has pointed out, sociologists of science such as Bernard Barber and Warren
Hagstrom came to similar conclusions as Merton regarding the central norms of science. Rai,
supra note 7, at 89. Barber and Hagstrom were followers of Merton's school, and this Note
focuses on Merton because of his foundational position in the sociology of science and the
influence of his works on subsequent generations of scholars.
44. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 270-78 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).
45. Id. at 273.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 275. The political overtones of Merton's normative view of science were sometimes
quite explicit, as when he observed that capitalism's excessive focus on individual property
interests had led some scientists to advocate socialism. Id.
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frustrate science.49 Merton sharply disapproved ° of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., which stated,
"The inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his
absolute property. He may withhold the knowledge of it from the
public .... ,,5 Ultimately, Merton perceived a sharp conflict between "the
communal character of ownership in new scientific discoveries and the
exclusivity of private property rights in a capitalist economy.
', 52
Some patent scholars have echoed Merton's condemnation of
intellectual property rights, particularly in the context of biomedical
research. These scholars observe a fundamental tension between the
proprietary development of end-product pharmaceuticals and the research
community's tradition of open, communal science.53 Privatization and
commercialization "threaten to undermine certain cornerstones of our
scientific infrastructure. 54  Robert Merges notes that the harsh,
individualistic nature of property rights clashes with science's communal
spirit.55 In tangible terms, these observations have led to "renewed interest
in eliminating patents for scientific research directed toward isolating and
characterizing human genes. 56 The prescription arising from these critiques
is a narrowing of patent regimes to preserve the communal norms that are




51. 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897).
52. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1047.
53. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 289.
54. Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific
Research, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Summer 1996, at 145, 146.
55. Id. at 145 ("[C]ommercializing the heretofore noble, pure, and otherwise untainted field
of science is not just poor policy, but intrinsically bad."). Ambivalence over patent law arises not
only from its conflict with norms of communal sharing in science, but also from its conflict with
free-market economic principles. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's deep-seated
antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage progress.").
56. Merges, supra note 54, at 146.
57. Of course, eliminating patents would not necessarily lead to the kind of communal
sharing that Merton, Merges, and others advocate. Given the increasing commercialization of
science, if patents were unavailable parties could conceivably opt for different, potentially
stronger forms of intellectual property claims, such as trade secrets, to protect the confidentiality
of valuable information against unauthorized access. In the anticommons framework, trade secrets
would have an even more deleterious impact on scientific progress, because the element of public
disclosure-perhaps the only redeeming function of patent regimes in a communalist
framework-would be absent. Implicit in the communalists' arguments against patents, therefore,
is an assumption that even stronger forms of trade secret protection would not be available.
Consistent with this conceptualization, when this Note discusses policy prescriptions to weaken
patent regimes, it assumes a general loosening of intellectual property protection that would
include appropriately modifying trade secret law.
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The observations of Merton and like-minded patent commentators
relate to a broader debate over whether communal sharing or strictly
enforced individual property rights best facilitate progress in collaborative
enterprises. Yochai Benkler has described how sharing norms in areas such
as parallel computing and carpooling lead to significant economic
production.58 Regarding information technologies, Lawrence Lessig has
argued that the Internet should function as an "information commons"
based on open source technologies, 59 a rationale that also underlies the
Linux operating system. Such a model's commitment to sharing reflects the
view that individual property rights in the information sciences may in fact
discourage innovation.6 ° Policymakers advocating a public domain for
science have also invoked the innovation-enhancing effects of the fair use
doctrine in copyright.61 In a general sense, "society as a whole would be
best served by the rapid and free dissemination of all newly conceived
ideas, so that maximum productive use of the idea could be made at the
earliest possible moment. 62
2. The Tragedy of the Anticommons
Merton's normative critique of individual property rights finds further
expression among property scholars who warn against the tragedy of the
anticommons. Classical property theory posits that the absence of property
rights over a particular resource leads to overuse, resulting in a tragedy of
the commons.63 The converse situation, in which too many individuals hold
rights to exclude over the same resource, leads to inefficient underuse.
Commentators have dubbed this the tragedy of the anticommons, and such
a phenomenon explains why patents may actually inhibit what Kuhn would
recognize as normal science, particularly in biomedical research.
An anticommons is "a property regime in which multiple owners hold
effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource." 64 Such scenarios,
58. Yochai Benlder, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004).
59. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6-8 (1999).
60. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 534, 570 (2003).
61. In 1984, Congress passed the so-called Hatch-Waxman Act, which allows companies to
use patented material to conduct experiments testing the efficacy and bioequivalence of generic
drugs. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 21, and 35
U.S.C.). The legislative history of the Act states, "Just as we have recognized the doctrine of fair
use in copyright, it is appropriate to create a similar mechanism in the patent law." H.R. REP. No.
98-857 (pt. 2), at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
62. Abramson, supra note 3, at 92.
63. See Hardin, supra note 40, at 1244-45.
64. Heller, supra note 5, at 668 (emphasis omitted).
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moreover, often result in underdevelopment of that resource. 6" To explain
this theory, Michael Heller compares stores with street kiosks in post-
comnunnist Russia.66 Complex governmental regulations grant multiple
parties overlapping property rights over various store functions. One
individual, for example, may have the right to sell products, another the
right to receive sales revenue, and yet another the right to arrange leases.
67
Because disparate parties exercise effective rights to exclude over the same
resource, nobody invests in developing the store, leaving shelves barren and
customers scarce.68 Heller contrasts this with the situation of street kiosks in
Moscow: Individual owners exercise a significant amount of control over
their kiosks, which attract frequent customers and whose shelves are
regularly stocked with goods.69
Applied to biomedical research, the tragedy of the anticommons
explains how patents may actually deter innovation.7 ° While earlier
commentators focused on innovation as a unitary act by a single player,
expositors of the tragedy of the anticommons recognize the multiparty,
multiphase mechanics of contemporary research and development. Patents
on upstream research tools can inhibit downstream research that depends
upon those tools as critical inputs to experimentation. 71 Thus, for example,
patents on research tools necessary to screen therapeutic agents can inhibit
a pharmaceutical company's efforts to develop marketable drugs. In short,
"intellectual property rights have threatened to restrict access to materials
and techniques that are critical for future research., 72 While patents have
contributed to unprecedented levels of investment in biomedical research
and development, in the long run their exclusionary function "may hinder
rather than accelerate biomedical research. 73
A tragedy of the anticommons can impede scientific practice in several
ways. In some cases, literal enforcement of the patentee's right to exclude
can lead to the outright failure of scientific exchange with other researchers.
Normally, however, upstream patentees have a financial incentive to
65. Id.
66. Id. at 622.
67. Id. at 623.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
71. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 295.
72. Introduction, in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 1, 1; see also David C.
Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the
Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 REs. POL'Y 99, 101 (2001) ("[W]idespread patenting and
licensing of the results of fundamental research or of tools whose principal use is in further
research could hinder the advance of science, and this area deserves particular attention in future
research.").
73. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 291.
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negotiate licenses with downstream developers. In these cases, patents will
not eliminate downstream appropriation but merely retard it through the
friction of transaction costs.7 4 This raises the question of whether markets
for determining licensing fees are truly efficient. Additional obstacles such
as administrative burdens, time constraints, and lack of familiarity with
licensing procedures may also prevent scientists from obtaining licenses for
research tools even when equilibrium prices are otherwise acceptable.75 The
need to independently negotiate and "bundle" licenses from multiple patent
holders can significantly raise transaction costs and create potential holdout
scenarios where patentees can charge a premium for their licenses.
76
C. The Mixed Relationship of Patents to Normal Scientific Progress
Significantly, both traditional patent theorists and expositors of the
tragedy of the anticommons frame their observations in the utilitarian
language of promoting technological development and mainstream
research. Even Merton, who addressed the role of patents in basic scientific
research, situated his views in the everyday work of the scientific
community and did not consider paradigmatic innovation. Both sides of the
patent debate thus exhibit a preoccupation with what Kuhn would consider
normal science. It is interesting to consider, moreover, the startling degree
to which arguments of both schools resonate with Kuhn's framework and
reveal the conflicting effects of patents on normal scientific progress.
Traditional patent theory reveals several characteristics of patents that
encourage progress in normal science. The disclosure requirement helps
define new paradigms by illustrating and publicizing the scientific theories
that underlie novel technologies. Courts have recognized that "[t]he
information contained in patents is a major source of scientific as well as
technologic knowledge. Indeed, in many areas of technology, technical
74. Exclusive licenses on a diagnostic test for haemochromatosis have significantly reduced
the number of laboratories conducting that test. Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the
Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002). Because clinical study is necessary to further investigate the
gene underlying haemochromatosis, commentators fear that "limiting clinical testing will inhibit
further discovery as well as the understanding that emerges naturally from broad medical
adoption." Id.
75. See WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS, NIH, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP, at
"Background" (1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm ("It seems
to be increasingly common . . . for the terms of these [material transfer] agreements to interfere
with the widespread dissemination of research tools among scientists, either because owners and
users are unable to reach agreement on fair terms or because negotiations are difficult and cause
protracted delays.").
76. Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 158 n.9 (F. Scott Kieff
ed., 2003).
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information is not published outside of patent documents."" Patents further
promote normal scientific progress by facilitating the most efficient use of
new research tools. Disclosing the "best mode,7 8 for putting new inventions
into practice provides scientists with the most effective means for utilizing
patented restriction enzymes, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) protocols,
and other research tools, thus accelerating exploration of particular
paradigms.
Additionally, the government imprimatur of patents helps legitimate
novel technologies and the theories they apply. The statutory requirements
of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness 79 all attest to the substantive
merit of a new innovation. Patents validate inventions, which themselves
validate theories. In this manner, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer's 1980
patent on recombinant DNA cloning represented an implicit affirmation of
Watson and Crick's 1959 conceptualization of the double-helix structure of
DNA. 80 Furthermore, centralized government registration of patents helps
establish scientific consensus. An intellectual property landscape featuring
patents on gene splicing, PCR protocols, and oncogenic mice reveals that
molecular biologists have firmly embraced the primacy of DNA both as a
determinant of disease and as a promising source of new therapies. Perusing
a database of patent applications can quickly reveal the lines of inquiry that
a particular scientific community has deemed meaningful and worthwhile.
Finally, patents reinforce paradigms by directing research along a
particular template. In licensing agreements, downstream users situate their
activities, both materially and cognitively, within the original patent
holder's theoretical framework. Indeed, licenses may even dictate the
manner in which the patented material may be used. Licensing thus
facilitates the "filling out" or "puzzle solving" functions of normal science.
A licensing agreement is not an opportunity for challenging the basic
presumptions of an underlying theory; rather, it is an event that allows
extensions and refinements of a particular paradigm.
Patents, however, exhibit a split personality. While they provide
incentives to invent and to disclose new products and processes, they
simultaneously create a right to exclude others from using them. Patents,
77. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), corrected by Nos. 02-1052 & 02-1065,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
79. Id. §§ 101-103.
80. Though it seems odd to suggest that a foundational principle such as the double-helix
structure of DNA would need affirmation, the history of science provides many examples of
intense initial skepticism toward theories that appear self-evident to the contemporary mind. See,
e.g., JEROME J. LANGFORD, GALILEO, SCIENCE, AND THE CHURCH (3d ed. 1992).
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therefore, have a mixed relationship to progress in normal science. 81 As we
have seen, patents undermine sharing norms that facilitate communal
paradigm definition and exploration. While patents may help publicize new
theories and research tools, patents also build proprietary fences around
them that inhibit their widespread exploitation. Strictly enforced intellectual
property rights, particularly on research tools, threaten collective puzzle
solving within paradigms.
Furthermore, the high transaction costs associated with tragedies of the
anticommons can discourage valuable knowledge transfer. Normal science
is cumulative and operates best with efficient networks for scientists to
appropriate and augment each other's intellectual work. Patents lead to
excessive exclusivity, thus undermining scientists' capacity to gather
technical knowledge and explore the theoretical contours of prevailing
paradigms.
Ultimately, the degree to which patents exert a net positive or negative
effect on innovation in normal biomedical science is a complex empirical
question that this Note does not attempt to resolve.82 Based on interviews
with intellectual property attorneys, scientists, business representatives, and
government officials, John Walsh and his colleagues concluded that patents
on research tools rarely prevent the pursuit of worthwhile projects.83 To a
certain extent, scientific norms still generate social pressure to share
materials, particularly with nonprofit entities.84 In many cases, patent-
holding scientists assert far less than their full exclusionary rights.85
Pharmaceutical companies frequently exercise "rational forbearance" in
deciding not to sue investigators at research institutions for patent
infringement. 86 Some have observed a two-tiered model in which scientists
freely exchange findings in the spirit of academic cooperation while
81. Furthermore, many of the normal-science-reinforcing attributes of patents can be fulfilled
by other mechanisms. For example, publication in peer-reviewed journals remains the primary
avenue for formal dissemination of scientific knowledge.
82. See Arti K. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action: The Case of Biotechnology
Research with Low Commercial Value, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL REGIME (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=568521
("From an empirical standpoint, the net impact [on downstream development] of recent increases
in upstream biotechnology rights is far from clear."); see also lain M. Cockburn, The Changing
Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 10, 17-20 (presenting
arguments both for and against strong patenting of upstream biomedical research tools).
83. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1020 (2003).
84. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 296 ("[P]atent holders practice an informal regime of
price discrimination in favor of nonprofit researchers, primarily by not enforcing their patents
against such researchers for non-commercial uses.").
85. Merges, supra note 54, at 150.
86. Leon Rosenberg, Perspectives from Different Sectors: Major Pharmaceutical Company,
in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 61, 63.
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university lawyers haggle over the rights and licensing agreements.87 The
NIH's declaration that raw human genomic DNA sequence information
should not be patentable as a matter of doctrine and policy reflects the
sustained ethos of communal sharing of scientific knowledge.
Significant evidence, however, reveals that intellectual property rights
are directly or indirectly impeding productive scientific exchange in
biomedical research. In one survey, Eric Campbell and others found that
twenty-seven percent of geneticists cited the need to honor the requirements
of an industrial sponsor as an important reason for withholding research
results, techniques, and materials useful in future investigations from fellow
academic scientists. 88 In the same survey, twenty-one percent of geneticists
cited the need to protect the commercial value of results as a reason for
withholding data and materials from others. 89 The 1988 decision by Cetus, a
private biotechnology firm, to enforce aggressively its patent on PCR
technology--even with exceptions for academic research-raised concerns
that such enforcement would discourage university scientists from adopting
the technology. 90 Christopher Hazuka warns that the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation's patents on stem cells could "limit exploration of the
properties and potential uses of [human embryonic stem] cells."
91
Furthermore, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg invoke the
anticommons model to argue against allowing patents over gene
fragments. 92 They argue, moreover, that patenting of receptors may
frustrate testing that is crucial to screening candidate pharmaceuticals.
93
The potentially innovation-inhibiting effects of patents have led some to
argue for stricter constraints on patenting upstream experimental methods
and products.94 In addition, an NIH working group has proposed remedial
87. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is
This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223, 242 (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
88. Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a
National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 478 (2002). The most common reasons cited for withholding
information and materials included the effort required to produce the requested items (eighty
percent) and the need to protect a junior colleague's ability to publish findings (sixty-four
percent). Id. These findings suggest a very different scientific reality than Merton's norm of
communal sharing.
89. Id.
90. Cetus To Exact Royalties from PCR Sales; Probe Absolves Convicted Rapist, BIOTECH.
NEWSWATCH, Sept. 5, 1988, at 7.
91. Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for
Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 157-
58 (2002).
92. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 70, at 699; cf Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The Software
Patent Experiment, Bus. REV., Third Quarter 2004, at 22, 30 (noting how patent thickets in the
software industry have been correlated with decreases in research and development).
93. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 70, at 699.
94. See, e.g., Hazuka, supra note 91, at 220.
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measures to address the fact that "[m]any scientists and institutions
involved in biomedical research are frustrated by growing difficulties and
delays in negotiating the terms of access to research tools. 95
While further empirical investigation is necessary to quantify the net
relationship of patents to normal scientific innovation, these studies indicate
that patents' influence on innovation is not always salutary, and that the
tragedy of the anticommons is a phenomenon to be taken seriously. If
nothing else, the unique status of research tools as gateways to basic
scientific research and downstream development suggests that patent law
should treat them differently than traditional end products, a concept this
Note more fully addresses in Part IV. As we will see, the potential to
constrain normal progress appears particularly troubling given the recent
expansion of patents over research tools, the inputs of basic biomedical
research. Ultimately, however, these constraints may provoke attempts by
researchers to transcend the limitations of normal scientific practice through
innovations in scientific theory.
III. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR NORMAL SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
A. Trends Encouraging Greater Patenting of Research Tools
The potential for tragedies of the anticommons is particularly salient
within the field of biomedical research. Rapid scientific advances, growing
commercial interest in biomedical research, changes in U.S. patent policy,
and the strengthening of patent doctrine have created a contemporary
landscape in which patents are increasingly influencing the mode, scope,
and direction of biomedical research.
By the mid-1970s, biomedical technology had made significant strides
as a productive area of university research and had attracted considerable
commercial interest.96 In 1980, Stanford researchers Stanley Cohen and
Herbert Boyer patented the technique for gene splicing, which became one
of the most profitable university-based intellectual property assets of its
generation. 97 Also in 1980, Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole University and
Small Business Patent Procedures Act, more commonly known as the
95. WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 75, at "Executive Summary."
96. Mowery et al., supra note 72, at 116.
97. Id. at 110. The recombinant DNA patent has accounted for more licensing revenues than
any other invention of the University of California or Stanford University, two early leaders in
university biotechnology patenting.
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Bayh-Dole Act.98 Contrary to previous practice, the Act permitted and
actively encouraged universities to patent inventions and discoveries that
arose from publicly funded research. 99 Though advances in molecular
biology in the late 1970s had already led some universities to seek patents,
patenting activity increased sharply after the passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act. 100
During this period, courts also strengthened patent doctrine. In 1980,
the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that a live, human-
made microorganism constitutes patentable subject matter'01 and thus
"opened the door to patenting the organisms, molecules, and research
techniques emerging from biotechnology." 10 2 With the express objective of
unifying and strengthening the patent law, Congress created the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.103 The Federal Circuit has adopted
a generally supportive attitude toward patents, which has heightened
patenting activity and promoted imaginative claiming strategies.
10 4
Between 1980 and 1992, the number of patents granted annually to
universities grew from 250 to almost 2700.105 Throughout the current
period of rapid scientific and technological advance, research institutions
98. Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§ 6(a), 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 3015, 3018-29 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212
(2000)).
99. Notably, the Act begins by stating, "It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use
the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development." 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). Before the Bayh-Dole Act, university-based
researchers could apply for individual patents on inventions arising from public funds, but these
applications were subject to federal review on a case-by-case basis. In the 1960s and 1970s, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the National Science Foundation negotiated
several institutional patent agreements with individual universities. Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act,
however, statutory default rules held that the federal government retained all intellectual property
rights arising from publicly funded research. See Mowery et al., supra note 72, at 10 1-03.
100. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 291-92. The Bayh-Dole Act has been called
"[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-
century." Innovation's Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 3, 3. The apparent benefits
of the Bayh-Dole Act have prompted attempts to emulate it in Germany and the United Kingdom.
Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 93 (2004). Its exact
contributions to patenting and scientific progress, however, are the subject of considerable
academic debate. David Mowery and Arvids Ziedonis conclude that the Act itself had little effect
on the content of academic research, though it did lead some universities to enter the realm of
patenting and licensing. Mowery et al., supra note 72; see David C. Mowery & Arvids A.
Ziedonis, Academic Patent Quality and Quantity Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act in the
United States, 31 RES. POL'Y 399 (2002) [hereinafter Mowery & Ziedonis, Academic Patent
Quality]; David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Numbers, Quality, and Entry: How Has the
Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON.
187 (2001).
101. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
102. Mowery & Ziedonis, Academic Patent Quality, supra note 100, at 415.
103. Rai, supra note 7, at 95.
104. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 290.
105. Rai, supra note 7, at 109.
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have had to adapt to declining growth in public funding for basic science
research 0 6 and have established robust technology-transfer offices to
oversee the patenting and licensing of their discoveries. 0 7 The financial
incentives at stake in university patents have further blurred the line
separating noncommercial from commercial research. 0 8  These
developments have inculcated a cultural shift at universities, which now
view novel materials, methods, and information developed for use in
research as valuable intellectual properties. 109 This ethos extends to the
individual researcher as well, for "[r]egardless of what motivates a
scientist,... he or she cannot make any progress in the vast majority of
scientific disciplines without a great deal of money."" 0 This sentiment
diverges sharply from Merton's vision of scientific communism and the
romantic ideal of the disinterested philosopher.
Based on these developments, universities have received patents on a
host of biomedical research tools, including recombinant DNA
technology, 1 ' human embryonic stem cells,' 2 and oncogenic nonhuman
mammals.' 13 These materials and processes represent valuable inputs to
further downstream research, "thereby accelerating the encroachment of the
patent system into what was formerly the domain of open science."
' 1 4
B. The Narrowing of the Experimental Use Exception
The anticommons hypothesis depends on the exclusivity of property
rights over patented material. Patent law, however, has traditionally allowed
free use of patented material for strictly academic, philosophical, and
noncommercial applications. In its original form, the so-called
"experimental use exception" legally instantiated Merton's norm of
scientific communism and facilitated the communal puzzle solving that is
characteristic of normal science. The vanishing distinction between
commercial and noncommercial science, however, has led to a severe
narrowing of experimental use.
106. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 2.
107. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 70, at 698.
108. Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: Opportunities and
Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive Field, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 87, at 251, 251-52.
109. Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 228.
110. Merges, supra note 54, at 155.
111. Mowery et al., supra note 72, at 110.
112. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 293.
113. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1079.
114. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 291.
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Justice Story's 1813 opinion in Whittemore v. Cutter laid the
foundation for the common law experimental use defense." 15 Regarding an
infringement suit over a card-making machine, Justice Story stated in
dictum, "[I]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish
a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects."' 16 Central to this early
formulation of experimental use was a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial applications of patented material. In a later decision, Justice
Story described commercial use as "the making with an intent to use for
profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to
ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification.
1' 17
William Robinson's The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions, 118 which
courts continued to cite into the 1980s, 119 provided a widely influential
definition of the experimental use exception. Under the title "No Act an
Infringement unless it Affects the Pecuniary Interests of the Owner of the
Patented Invention," the treatise asserted that where patented material "is
made or used as an experiment, whether for the gratification of scientific
tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interests of the patentee are
not antagonized."1 20 Robinson's distinction between commercial and
noncommercial interests resonated with court opinions such as Katz v.
Horni Signal Manufacturing Corp., where Judge Frank observed,
Epoch-making "discoveries" of "mere" general scientific
"laws," without more, cannot be patented. So the great
"discoveries" of Newton or Faraday could not have been rewarded
with such a grant of monopoly. Interestingly enough, apparently
many scientists like Faraday care little for monetary rewards;
generally the motives of such outstanding geniuses are not
pecuniary.
12 1
Judge Frank's opinion affirms Merton's scientific norm of disinterestedness;
for the court, the altruistic spirit of scientific discovery was closely
correlated with the universal, nonpatentable nature of scientific truth.
115. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
116. Id. at 1121.
117. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
12,391). This doctrine found further expression in later decisions, such as Poppenhusen %'. Falke,
which stated that "an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee." 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
118. 1-3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS (1890).
119. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1034.
120. 3 ROBINSON, supra note 118, § 898, at 55-56.
121. 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944) (footnote omitted).
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Contemporary courts, perhaps responding to the increasingly
commercial nature of scientific research, no longer yiew academic science
in this romantic light. In 2002, the Federal Circuit held in Madey v. Duke
University that Duke's use of laser technology that had been previously
patented by a recently departed researcher constituted infringement. 22 In
holding for plaintiff Madey, the court stated that "so long as the [suspect]
act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense."'123 Duke had advanced the argument that it
qualified for the experimental use exception because its alleged
infringement served no commercial purpose and occurred within the
context of nonprofit university research. The court, however, repudiated
this argument with a broad interpretation of "business" application. Duke's
use of the patented laser technology "unmistakably further[ed] the
institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating and
enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects. 1 24 These
projects enhanced Duke's reputation and allowed it to "lure lucrative
research grants, students and faculty."'' 25 Because Duke is in the business of
teaching and conducting research, use of Madey's patented laser
represented a commercial application and, therefore, patent infringement.
Under Madey, universities-historically the paragons of disinterested
research-can no longer unequivocally claim an experimental use defense
for academic uses of patented material.
Other recent decisions have also articulated an extremely narrow
construction of "experimental use." In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, the Federal Circuit rejected the notion of the experimental use
doctrine as a complete defense to liability, noting that experimental use may
be more properly regarded as "de minimis infringement better addressed by
limited damages."'126 In a concurring opinion to Embrex, Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp., Judge Rader went even further, categorically asserting
that "the Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use
excuses for infringement."' 27 In Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., the
District of Connecticut reiterated Madey's "very narrow" and "strictly
122. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
123. Id. at 1362.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Nos. 02-1052 & 02-1065, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, at *6 n.2 (Fed. Cir. June 6,
2003). Merck KGaA. a German pharmaceutical and chemical company, is wholly independent of
Merck & Co., the American pharmaceutical company. For convenience, this Note (as well as the
Federal Circuit) refers to Merck KGaA as "Merck."
127. 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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limited" view of the experimental use exception. 128 The court also affirmed
Madey's holding that even a nonprofit university's use of patented material
could serve business objectives, thus constituting patent infringement.129
While the experimental use defense has rarely succeeded in practice, it has
long been available in theory.' 30 Increasingly, however, courts are cutting
away at the theoretical basis of the doctrine itself.
These developments have led some scholars to conclude that, in
general, U.S. law does not exempt research activities from patent
infringement claims.13' In response, commentators have argued that the
benefits of unencumbered scientific exchange "would lead us to consider
very seriously proposals to formalize a line of legal decisions hinting at a
pure research exemption to patent infringement."' 132 The challenge of
combining the powerful incentive of monopoly power with the exchange-
enhancing properties of open access lies at the heart of patent policy, and is
a fundamental question to which this Note will return. Nevertheless, in
concrete terms, Duke and other universities are "reeling at the prospect of a
'major behavioral change"' in the wake of Madey.133 Experimental use no
longer represents a practicable defense against charges of patent
infringement for the vast bulk of university research.
C. Implications of Commercialization for Patent Law and
Scientific Progress
Scientific, economic, statutory, and legal trends-including the
narrowing of the experimental use exception-have set the stage for patents
to exert an ever-growing influence over biomedical research. As scientists
seek to patent more and more inputs of biomedical experimentation, they
will patent products and processes earlier in the development chain, where
patents play their most significant role.
Unsurprisingly, some have welcomed the extension of patents over
research tools as bringing the traditional incentives of innovation to this
128. 311 F. Supp. 2d 293, 296 (D. Conn. 2004) (quoting Madey, 307 F.3d at 13[61-62])
(internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 297 ("The proper focus is not on whether uses are non-commercial or not-for-
profit but rather whether they are in keeping with defendants' customers' legitimate business
objectives, including educating project participants, and increasing the university's or laboratory's
status or ability to lure research grants, students, or researchers; but not solely for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.").
130. Rebecca Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools and the Law, in NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 6, 11.
131. Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 223 n. 1.
132. Merges, supra note 54, at 164.
133. Mark D. Uehling, BIO-IP 'Harbor' No Longer Safe For Research?, BIO-IT WORLD,
Aug. 13, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.bio-itworld.com/news/081303_report3O76.html
(quoting David Korn, Am. Ass'n of Med. Coils.).
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specialized class of products. In Integra Lifesciences I, the Federal Circuit
considered Integra's claim that Merck had infringed various patents dealing
with a peptide sequence that promotes cell adhesion. 34 In its defense,
Merck invoked 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (originally passed as part of the
Hatch-Waxman Act), which allows companies free use of patented
materials for the purpose of conducting preliminary tests on candidate drugs
for FDA approval.1 35 The Federal Circuit rejected Merck's unlicensed use
of the peptide, a research tool, explaining that allowing Merck's free use of
this material "would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees
owning biotechnology tool patents.' 36 Recognizing the value of research
tools in various aspects of drug development, 37 the court stated that the
incentives and rewards of the patent system should be available to
encourage the creation and marketing of these products.
The concerns of the anticommons school thus appear to have
considerable weight. Arti Rai contends that "the highly aggressive patenting
of basic research encouraged by post-1980 statutory and case law does not
in fact further the economic goal of developing new products."'
' 38
Consequently, she argues for a larger public domain in research.1 39 Even
scientists who have no intention of patenting their discoveries run up
against the patents of others when attempting to use protected research
tools. 140 Significantly, patent doctrine accentuates the ramifications of
patents on research tools. "Because the princip[al] constraint on the scope
of patent claims is prior knowledge in the field of the invention," patents on
research tools in novel fields lacking prior art may be quite broad.141 In this
manner, patents on products, processes, and equipment in relatively
unexplored fields can grant scientists an extensive scope of proprietary
rights over uncharted territory.
On a deeper level, the increasing patenting of research tools means that
the "private fence" of property rights will come nearer and nearer to
enclosing theories themselves. Traditional patent doctrine confines patent
134. Nos. 02-1052 & 02-1065, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). This provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act is commonly
referred to as an "experimental use exception," but it is a very different kind of exception than
Justice Story's creation in Whittemore. The Hatch-Waxman exception allows pharmaceutical
firms to use protected material in order to conduct tests to develop potential generic versions of
patented drugs. Id.; see supra note 61. As such, it contemplates a clear commercial application of
patented material, which distinguishes it from the Whittemore doctrine that specifically and solely
exempted noncommercial uses of patented material in scientific inquiry.
136. Integra Lifesciences I, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, at *18.
137. Id. at *18-19 ("After all, patented tools often facilitate general research to identify
candidate drugs, as well as downstream safety-related experiments on those new drugs.").
138. Rai, supra note 7, at 115.
139. Id. at 152.
140. Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 197.
141. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 296.
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protection to applied technologies rather than their underlying theories.
Courts have denied patent protection for theoretical or abstract
discoveries, 14  natural laws, 143 naturally occurring products, 144 and
mathematical algorithms. 45 But all theories give rise to a unique material
culture that enables researchers to demonstrate, investigate, and validate
them. 146 Newton's hypothesis that white light contains the full spectrum of
colors is intimately related to the physical prisms he used to split light.
Abstract theories of high-energy physics and subatomic particles find
physical expression in the concrete, wires, and intricate designs of particle
accelerators. The current biological paradigm focusing on the therapeutic
potential of DNA manipulation has produced and assigned great value to a
closely related material culture of gene splicing techniques, PCR protocols,
and human embryonic stem cells. If the materials and procedures necessary
to investigate a particular theory are strictly patented, then in some relevant
sense individual property rights inhere in the theory itself. These exclusive
rights to explore theories, moreover, can play an important role in inducing
paradigm shifts.
IV. PATENTS, PARADIGM SHIFTS, AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
A. Alternative Hypothesis Generation and the Path to Paradigm Shifts
While traditional patent scholarship argues that patents promote
progress, the anticommons theory counterintuitively posits that patents may
have the opposite effect. This Note offers another perspective and applies
the theory of paradigm shifts to reveal once again how patents contribute to
progress, though in terms and scope that neither traditional patent scholars
nor proponents of the anticommons have addressed. Patents on upstream
research tools raise the cost of conducting downstream biomedical research.
At the margin, these higher costs provide an extra incentive for scientists to
reconceptualize "familiar" natural processes in ways that do not rely on
patented research tools for their exploration. Patents on critical inputs to
experimentation thus encourage the generation of radically novel theories
142. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. RCA, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324,
1328 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
143. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
144. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
145. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
146. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KOHLER, LORDS OF THE FLY: DROSOPHILA GENETICS AND THE
EXPERIMENTAL LIFE (1994) (exploring how the common fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster, has
been a remarkably productive research tool whose properties have suggested many lines of
genetic research).
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about the structure and function of natural phenomena, an essential first
step in paradigm shifts.
In Kuhn's framework, empirical inconsistencies and limitations of
predictive power motivate scientists to challenge a dominant paradigm with
insurgent theories. Patents provide additional incentives-legal and
economic-to theorize outside of a dominant paradigm. If specific
biological materials are indispensable for conducting a certain line of
research, patents on those materials can hinder experimentation to such an
extent that a scientist is induced to develop alternate ways of
conceptualizing and investigating the subject of her research. After all,
"[w]hen progress in research depends on the relatively unfettered flow of
low value exchanges of information and materials among scientists, a
proliferation of intellectual property claims to the objects of these
exchanges may impose transaction costs that consume the gains from
exchange. 147 In traditional patent theory, patents provide an incentive to
innovate in order to receive payments from others; in an anticommons or
Kuhnian sense, patents provide an incentive to innovate in order to avoid
paying someone else and accepting exogenous constraints on one's
research. These legal and economic considerations shore up existing
empirical, epistemological, and reputational incentives for challenging
dominant paradigms. Consistent with Kuhn's framework, patents can
induce failures of normal science that then provoke paradigm shifts.
Central to this argument are the unique role of research tools as
gateways to basic research, the growing commodification of science, the
rise of patents on research tools, and the consequent encroachment of
patents on the realm of abstract theory. Patents are increasingly important to
determining whether and how a scientist engages in a particular line of
experimentation. Commercial pressures are motivating increased patenting
of research tools, which include inputs earlier and earlier in the
development chain. The costs and limitations of working with patented
research tools provide an incentive for scientists to seek out new ones. This
can translate into an incentive to fundamentally reconceive of particular
scientific problems in ways that do not depend on patented inputs for their
exploration. For a neuroscientist working on a treatment for Alzheimer's
disease, the exclusive patents on human embryonic stem cells provide an
incentive not only to investigate alternate mechanisms for neurogenesis but
also to test alternate theories of brain structure, physiology, and the
pathology of Alzheimer's itself.
A landscape of heavily patented research tools will, of course, engender
different responses from different scientists. Some may expend the
147. Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 234.
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resources to collect multiple licenses, others may abandon a particular line
of research, and others may simply infringe and risk litigation. At the
margin, however, the obstacle of patents will provide the additional
incentive for some scientists to imagine, formulate, and test novel theories
of natural phenomena that require an entirely unprecedented set of research
tools for their investigation. By preventing scientists from exploring
mainstream theories, patents encourage them to develop novel ones. 
148
Interestingly, courts have long recognized an analogous property of
patents, though they have never applied it in Kuhnian terms at the level of
scientific theory. In State Industries v. A.O. Smith Corp., for example, the
Federal Circuit concluded, "One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-
called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even
when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the
marketplace." 149 The Federal Circuit, in another case citing State Industries,
likewise held that the "incentive to 'design around' patents is a positive
result of the patent system."' 150 Courts, then, have recognized the valuable
burdensome role that patents play as roadblocks that innovators must then
creatively evade. While judicial discussions of "inventing around" have
only addressed the level of technological designs, the concept of paradigm
shifts illustrates that "inventing around" also operates at the level of
scientific theory. By analogy, patents on research tools-vital inputs to
basic science experimentation-encourage scientists to "theorize around"
established paradigms.
This radical theorization represents the alternative hypothesis
generation lying at the heart of paradigm shifts. This Note does not argue
that the obstacle of patents will automatically lead an insurgent theorist to
put forth a more "correct" alternative theory. The mechanism by which
patents encourage paradigm shifts involves much wasted activity,"55 which
is perhaps an intrinsic quality of macroscopic scientific (as well as
organismic) evolution. In some cases, it may simply be impossible to find a
route to scientific progress that does not require using research tools
belonging to another party. In other cases, however, the roadblock of
patents will stimulate scientists to generate new hypotheses about how a
particular biological process functions. Many of these hypotheses will
148. It would be ideal to be able to cite case studies where research tool patents so frustrated
scientists that they developed newer and more accurate theories about a particular scientific
problem. The extension of patents, over research tools in biomedical science, however, is a
relatively recent phenomenon, coinciding with scientific, economic, statutory, and legal
developments of the past few decades. In a wider sense, paradigm shifts of any magnitude are
extremely rare. Therefore, while patents sow the seeds for paradigm shifts, the dynamic described
here may require several generations to fully come to light.
149. 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
150. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
151. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1027-28.
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prove wrong, and their failures will further validate the existing paradigm.
But just as one random mutation among billions will lead to a fitness-
enhancing adaptation, some alternative theories will more cleanly and
completely explain how natural processes function and will exhibit greater
predictive capacity than the current state of the art. This type of alternative
hypothesis generation is the critical imaginative spark that induces
paradigm shifts.
Kuhn's observations highlight the deep, paradigmatic progress that
defines scientific revolutions. Applying these observations to the empirical
realities of modem commercial research, the traditional links between
patents and progress appear to be inverted. As Bruce Abramson explains,
The patent system was designed to insure that the knowledge
embodied in the patented good is disseminated widely, while the
commercial exploitation of that knowledge by anyone other than
the patent holder is severely restricted. This protection may be
viewed as shallow for scientific purposes but deep for commercial
purposes. 152
Within the anticommons reality of modem biomedical research, patents can
frustrate downstream development and create an incentive to fundamentally
reconceptualize research problems. Paradoxically, intellectual property
protection in the biomedical field may actually function as shallow for
technological progress but deep for scientific purposes. Christopher Hazuka
asks the rhetorical question, "[I]s the patent system promoting innovation
overall when thousands of laboratories, physicians, and scientists must...
pay for the fight to study or use [a particular] DNA sequence to develop
therapies?"''53  Considering only the conditions most conducive to
alternative theory generation, the answer may be a surprising yes.
154
152. Abramson, supra note 3, at 99 (footnote omitted). Though Abramson does not frame his
observations in these terms, one could analogize "scientific purposes" to the deep progress of
paradigm shifts and "commercial purposes" to the application of prevailing theory, a characteristic
of normal science.
153. Hazuka, supra note 91, at 172-73.
154. In highlighting the benefits of paradigm shifts, it is important to acknowledge their
extreme rarity relative to normal scientific activity. Paradigm shifts are once-in-a-generation
(indeed, generation-defining) events, whereas normal science comprises the vast majority of
scientific activity at any given time. For some, the prospect of structuring the patent system to
favor seismic paradigm shifts at the expense of normal science may be likened to striving for
wealth by spending all of one's income on lottery tickets. Several responses to this
counterargument arise. First, if expected income is a product of the magnitude of a particular
payoff and its probability of occurring, then the profound-perhaps immeasurable-value of
paradigm shifts may indeed justify a "wasteful" patent system that encourages their inducement.
One must bear in mind that evolutions of scientific theory are valuable not only as epistemological
ends in themselves, but as gateways to new generations of useful applications that exploit more
sophisticated understandings of nature. Regarding the issue of probability, policymakers can
attempt to calibrate patent regimes to accelerate hypothesis generation and increase the frequency
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While this Note has framed paradigm shifts as distinct from normal
science, it is important to underscore the centrality of normal science to
facilitating these profound reformulations of scientific theory. Normal
science and paradigm shifts form an inseparable dialectic in which one
defines and induces the other. Patents on research tools encourage scientists
to take the foundational step of positing new theories and conducting
experiments to evaluate them. In order to truly challenge the dominant
paradigm, however, a new theory must be subject to normal scientific
processes of falsification 155 and validation; only consistent affirmation of an
insurgent theory provides the necessary predicate for a paradigm shift.
Therefore, any attempt to encourage paradigm shifts must in some ways
encourage normal science as well. This Note has highlighted the possibility
that restricted access to research tools-and the concomitant inability to
explore certain theories-will encourage scientists to "trade upward" for
more sophisticated, empirically accurate paradigms. The possibility exists,
however, for scientists to "trade downward," creating and even defending
theories of biological phenomena with even less scientific merit than the
status quo. The crucial mechanism that separates the meritorious wheat
from the merely speculative chaff is normal science. Consequently, this
Note's account of the benefits of an overpropertied research tool landscape
should not be interpreted as a wholesale endorsement of restrictions on
basic experimental inputs. After all, if normal science grinds to a halt,
paradigm shifts will as well. Consequently, an ideal patent system would
preserve both the normal-science-facilitating function of open access and
the paradigm-shift-encouraging function of exclusive property. While the
current patent system attempts to strike the proper balance, the prospect of
monopolies on upstream, gateway research tools counsels for a surprising
inversion of traditional patent logic.
B. Research Tools, Upstream Monopolies, and the Inversion of
Traditional Patent Logic
In this analysis, patents emerge as a switch that can selectively create
conditions conducive to paradigm shifts or conditions conducive to normal
science. Strict enforcement of patent rights over research tools, coupled
with the collective action problems inherent in the anticomnons and the
of breakthrough discoveries. Second, insistence on a stark dichotomy between normal science and
paradigm shifts is a category mistake that misses the deep interrelationships between the two. As
we will see, any meaningful attempt to structure a patent system to induce paradigm shifts must
also ensure the robust operation of normal science.
155. See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959) (arguing that one of
the defining attributes of science is that its claims are subject to "falsification," whereby a single
substantiated counterexample can undermine a theory's validity).
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absence of an experimental use exception, encourage the alternative
hypothesis generation that sparks paradigm shifts. Intrinsic to the design of
a patent system, however, is not just the period during which exclusive
tights obtain. Equally important is the long-term equilibrium in which the
law enables free appropriation of the innovative work of others. Expiration
of the patent term initiates a legally sanctioned, essentially infinite period
when intellectual assets that had required considerable private investment to
produce are relegated to the public domain, thereby facilitating normal
science. Given this more nuanced understanding of progress dynamics,
policymakers may consider new models for structuring and sequencing
these functions to better capture the benefits of both public access and
private incentives to innovate.
While discussions of paradigm shifts and normal science necessarily
engender a high degree of abstraction, Kuhn's framework reveals tangible
policy prescriptions for structuring patent regimes. This analysis suggests a
new model for patents on research tools in which a robust experimental use
exception would exist for a finite period of time immediately following the
granting of a patent. Under this proposal, materials and processes meeting
the NIH definition of a research tool 156 would only be eligible for a new
kind of patent, a so-called "research tool patent." A research tool patent
would be identical to a traditional patent except for one critical difference:
A robust experimental use exception would exist for a period of time-say
five years-at the start of the patent term. 157 During this period,
noncommercial experimental use of the patented research tool would be
permitted, as in the experimental use doctrine prior to Madey.158 Upon
expiration of this safe harbor, any nonlicensed use of the patented material,
even for experimentation with no direct commercial application, would
156. See supra note 6. Under this proposed model, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
perhaps in consultation with the NIH, would determine whether or not a particular candidate
product or process that satisfies all the requirements for patentability would receive a research tool
patent or a traditional patent. PTO officials could consider the patent applicant's own assessment
of whether the item constitutes a research tool, but the PTO would retain the discretion to make
the final determination.
157. Defining an optimal length for the experimental use period would require Congress to
investigate the cost structure of creating new research tools, rates of research tool invention and
obsolescence, and the time horizon for conducting biomedical experiments. I suggest five years
here as a reasonable balance between permitting sufficient time for scientists to conduct and
publish experiments with novel research tools and allowing creative firms to begin recouping their
costs relatively soon after their initial costs investments.
158. This proposal would use a more expansive definition of "experimental use" than the
Federal Circuit articulated in Madey that would exempt all uses of a research tool that were not
intended to produce, or that did not actually produce, a commercial application. This definition of
"experimental" would thus reject the Federal Circuit's overly formalistic reasoning that Duke's
use of patented laser technology constituted a business application simply because conducting
research is the mission of a research university, see Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-
62 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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constitute infringement, as per the Federal Circuit's holding in Madey.,59 In
this model, liberal experimental use of novel research tools would allow for
the communal sharing that facilitates normal science within a given
paradigm. 60 Free access to research tools closely associated with an
insurgent theory of natural causation would enable members of the
scientific community to engage in the crucial process of testing, refuting,
and perhaps validating that theory. After a fixed period of open access,
strict patent protection (even on experimental use) would commence,
establishing the exclusive rights and high transaction costs that encourage
innovation and paradigm-shifting theory generation.
Ironically, this system would invert current legal frameworks of
intellectual property. Traditionally, patent terms commence by granting
monopoly rights over new inventions, and expiration of the term initiates an
open-ended period of free appropriation. Likewise, copyright law gives
authors exclusive rights to control their works for a fixed period of time,
after which they fall into the public domain.' 61 The system described here
would privilege open access to novel research tools first, after which
exclusive rights would revert to the original patentee in order to maintain
the requisite incentives to innovate.
The key distinguishing factor that justifies this special treatment is the
unique role that research tools play in enabling basic science research and
downstream experimentation. Immediate access to research tools serves
two valuable goals that do not apply to traditional end products. First, if
research tools such as human embryonic stem cells are gateways to
exploring a new scientific paradigm, free or low-cost access to those
research tools is necessary to quickly and effectively explore the contours
and scope of that paradigm. Access to research tools facilitates "filling in"
interstitial gaps and identifying areas of promising subsequent investigation
and technical exploitation. Second, immediate access to research tools is
necessary to subject novel theories to falsification. 162 Patents on research
tools, while encouraging alternate theory generation, threaten to stagnate
159. Id. at 1362.
160. Of course, this arrangement raises the potential for parties to appropriate materials
protected by research tool patents under the guise of "experimental use," only to apply them to
develop commercially valuable products that they then wish to patent. Under this proposal, the
original research tool patentee would maintain ordinary patent rights to any commercial
application of her patented material; all parties desiring to develop commercial applications from
patented research tools within the first five years would be free to negotiate licenses to do so.
During the five-year period, the granting of licenses for particular commercial applications would
not affect the rights of third parties to continue unlicensed experimental use of patented research
tools.
161. The duration of copyright varies depending on a number of factors, including when the
author fixed or published the work. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (2000).
162. POPPER, supra note 155.
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normal science, allowing neither exploration nor refutation of broad
conceptual assertions. Therefore, this Note proposes a time-limited
experimental use exception to allow researchers unfettered access to novel
research tools for the purpose of conducting normal science.
These observations call into question the prudence of treating all
classes of products-whether upstream enablers of downstream
development or end-product consumer goods-identically in the eyes of the
patent law. Creating monopolies of building-block resources in an
upstream-downstream relationship presents qualitatively different problems
than creating side-by-side monopolies of end products.1 63 Research tools
are, by definition, critical inputs of scientific experimentation and are often
necessary to elucidate basic scientific theories. Therefore, as the
anticommons proponents might argue, patents on research tools may
uniquely frustrate the constitutional prerogative to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."' 64
Ultimately, however, as this Note has sought to establish, the
exclusionary function of patents can play an important role in the alternate
hypothesis generation that lies at the heart of paradigm shifts and
innovation in scientific theory. To the extent that research tools create
proprietary fences around particular theories of physiology, pathology, or
molecular biology, incentives to create new research tools also encourage
scientists to create new theories for the natural phenomena they investigate.
Though ignoring the vast potential for paradigm shifts, the Federal Circuit
is correct in acknowledging the immense value of research tools and the
worthiness of a system that helps produce them. 165 This Note thus proposes
a patent system that employs exclusive monopolies to encourage innovation
in research tools, though only after an initial period of free experimental
use. This proposal differs critically from that of Robert Merges, who calls
for formalizing a pure research exemption in patent doctrine.1 66 Merges's
proposal rightly recognizes the value of open access to research tools in
advancing what Kuhn would recognize as normal science. Merges
underappreciates, however, the role of exclusive property rights in spurring,
in some ways mandating, innovation. While permanent open access to
research tools may encourage innovation and development within a
paradigm, such a system may fail to capture the immense value of
innovations in paradigms themselves.
163. Epstein, supra note 76, at 163, 166.
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
165. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, Nos. 02-1052 & 02-1065, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27796, at *18-19 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003).
166. Merges, supra note 54, at 164.
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Imposing rights to exclude on research tools will ensure that insurgent
scientists face a legal landscape amenable to questioning those tools'
implicit theoretical assumptions. By combining an initial experimental use
exception with a generally strict patent regime on research tools, the patent
system can better enable both the normal science that evaluates theories and
the alternative hypothesis generation that produces new ones. In this
manner, patents can help accelerate the disparate processes that drive
paradigm shifts and the evolution of scientific theory.
CONCLUSION
This Note has applied insights from the history, philosophy, and
sociology of science to describe how exclusive property rights in critical
inputs to basic research may help induce paradigm shifts in biomedical
science. Traditional patent theorists focus on the positive effects that
patents exert on scientific and technological innovation. Critics, however,
argue that patents on upstream research tools disrupt norms of communal
sharing and can impede downstream experimentation and application.
Scholars on both sides of the debate have implicitly framed their arguments
in the utilitarian language of technological innovation. This Note has
applied Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm shifts to explore the impact of
patents on a different, more profound kind of progress: innovation at the
level of basic scientific theory.
For Kuhn, the deep, progress inherent in scientific revolutions arises
through paradigm shifts in which insurgent theories challenge and
ultimately overturn the dominant conceptual frameworks of the day. Kuhn's
framework is particularly salient to contemporary patent doctrine and
biomedical science given the encroachment of research tool patents into the
realm of scientific theory. The increasingly commercial nature of even
university-based research has created a close nexus between patents and
basic science, with parties patenting elemental research tools that are
crucial to exploring wide areas of theoretical interest. This Note does not
resolve the empirical question of whether patents, on balance, facilitate or
frustrate normal scientific progress; ultimately, such resolution is
unnecessary for this Note's central agenda, which is to describe the
surprising contribution of restricted access to biomedical research tools to
paradigm shifts.
Patents, by raising the cost of using research tools fundamental to a
given paradigm, provide scientists with an additional incentive to innovate
at the level of scientific theory. This is not the "shallow" innovation of
filling in the details of an existing paradigm. It is the more profound
innovation comprising a gestalt switch in how a researcher conceptualizes a
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress
particular scientific problem. Patents thus encourage nonconformist
theorizing around dominant conceptual frameworks and can ultimately
induce paradigm shifts. Normal science, however, plays a critical role in
this process as the mechanism by which scientists evaluate, validate, and
refute novel theories. Consequently, this analysis suggests an inversion of
traditional patent logic so that a time-limited experimental use exception
prevails in the period immediately following the granting of a patent on a
research tool. This limited experimental use exception would enable
immediate, costless appropriation of new research tools as well as maintain
the long-term incentives to innovate inherent in strong patent regimes.
Underlying these analyses is an assertion that the history, philosophy,
and sociology of science can elucidate previously unrecognized effects of
patents on scientific activity. Current patent scholarship has not fully
engaged the relationship between patents and the evolution of scientific
theory, and the scientific humanities can provide a robust theoretical
framework for filling this void. Without recognizing that patents can
influence paradigm shifts, policy choices defining intellectual property
regimes are uninformed and incomplete. While this Note has focused on
research tools in biomedical science, these phenomena may operate in other
fields of patented material as well. More empirical study is necessary to
delineate and quantify the precise ways that patents encourage and frustrate
normal collaborative development. At a minimum, the progress dynamics
developed in this Note highlight the unique differences between upstream
and downstream monopolies, and recommend a reexamination of the
current patent system's identical treatment of gateway and end-product
materials and processes. Contrary to romantic conceptions, science is not an
insular enterprise detached from the wider influences of society.
Increasingly, the basic science sector must contend with the powerful
exogenous forces of patents and commercial pressures. It is therefore
incumbent on policymakers, courts, and legal scholars to develop a greater
sensitivity to the intricate and unexpected ways that law impacts scientific
progress and to structure patent regimes accordingly.
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